| Let's start with a year ago, September, 2002, in the normal course
of political life, academic life, September is usually an incipient
month, a thing when important things begin to happen. September, 2002
was unusual in this respect. There were three very significant events
closely related. One was the declaration of the National Securities
Strategy, September 17. It announced very clearly and explicitly that
the United States, at least this administration, intends to dominate
the world permanently, if necessary, through the use of force. It's
the one dimension in which the United States reigns completely
supreme, probably now outspends the rest of the world combined or
close to it in military expenditure, is far ahead in developing
advanced and extremely dangerous technology. And it also announced
that it will eliminate any potential challenge to that rule. So, it's
to be permanent hegemony. That's the first event. That‚s not without
precedent. There are interesting precedents. We don't have time to go
into them unless you want to later, but this was unusual. It was
correct for the reaction to be as extreme as it was, including the
foreign policy elite here.
The second associated event was that in September, the war drums
began to beat loudly about the planned invasion of Iraq. Early
September, the National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice warned that
the next evidence we were likely to have about Saddam Hussein will be
a mushroom cloud, presumably over New York, no matter how much
everyone else may have hated him outside the United States, no one
feared him, including his neighbors who had been trying to reintegrate
Iraq back into the region, who despised him, including the country he
invaded but didn't fear him. That was unique to the United States,
beginning last September. So, first there's going to be a mushroom
cloud and then the propaganda campaign began very loud. The invasion
of Iraq that was planned was understood to be what sometimes is called
an exemplary action, that is, it's an action intended to demonstrate
dramatically that the doctrine that had been announced is intended
seriously. It's not enough to just promulgate a doctrine. If you want
people to take you seriously, you have to do something to show that
you mean it.
The invasion of Iraq was understood correctly to be a test case, a
demonstration case of the doctrine that the U.S. government arrogates
to itself the right to attack any country it wants without credible
pretext or without any international authorization. In fact, the
National Security Strategy is, as commentators quickly pointed out,
doesn't even mention international law and the United Nations charter.
In fact, the Bush administration proceeded to make it very clear to
the Security Council of the United Nations that they had two choices.
They could be irrelevant, that was the term that was used, by
authorizing the United States to use force as it wished, or they could
be a debating society, as Colin Powell, the administration moderate,
pointed out.
He -- Powell was also delegated to address the World Economic Forum
in Davos Switzerland the following January. This was -- you know what
that is. that's the group that -- the business press only
semi-ironically calls the masters of the universe. The people who own
the world, the corporate executives who are spending $30,000 for the
privilege of attending and other great and important figures. The mood
in Davos was completely different than any of the earlier meets. It
was very angry. The top issue was Iraq. They were strongly opposed to
it, just like the rest of the world. Powell faced a very hostile
audience, and he -- they were not eager to accept his message, which
was, as he put it, that the United States has the sovereign right to
use military force when we feel strongly about something. We will
lead, even if nobody else is following. We will do it because we have
the power to do it, and if you don't like it, too bad. The further
comments for the -- from the administration to the Security Council
and others were we're not going to ask for any authorization from you.
You can catch up, is the term that was used, and authorize us to do
what we are going to do anyway, or you're irrelevant.
That was reiterated very brazenly at the Azores summit, the
Bush-Blair summit a couple of days before the actual invasion. They
met at a military base on the Azores so they wouldn't have to face
mass popular opposition, which would have happened anywhere else. They
declared -- they issued an ultimatum not to Iraq, but to the United
Nations. The ultimatum was, give us your stamp of approval for what
we're going to do anyway, or else just go off and be a debating
society. They also made it clear that it didn't matter whether Saddam
Hussein and his cohorts stayed in Iraq or not, as Bush announced, even
if Saddam and his family and associates leave, we're going to invade
anyway. because the goal is to -- for us to control Iraq. That's my
words, not his. The rest is his words. It's all very clear and
explicit. You cannot miss it. It wasn't missed. I'll come back to
that.
The third event, before I come back to it, in September closely
related is that the congressional election campaign opened, the
mid-term election campaign. The main sort of campaign adviser for the
Republican Party, Karl Rove, one of the most important people in
Washington, he had already the preceding summer, the summer of 2002,
he had instructed party activists that in going into the electoral
campaign, they're going to have to emphasize national security issues.
They cannot expect to enter a political confrontation with -- if
economic and social policies are prominent on the agenda because their
policies are extremely unpopular, which is not surprising since they
are designed to be extremely harmful to the general population, and
people know that, and also to future generations. and you cannot go
into a political campaign with that kind of a platform.
So, therefore, it had to be national security issues. on the
assumption that people would shift their priorities and vote for the
-- those who were going to protect them from imminent destruction.
Well, for the elections it barely worked. By a few tens of thousands
of votes, in fact, but enough to allow them a bare hold on political
power. The voters preferences at the polls remained, as exit pole
polls revealed, remained the same, but priorities shifted, and enough
people huddled under the umbrella of power and fear of the demonic
enemy so that they could maintain control, barely.
Well, that illustrates one of the dilemmas of dominance that I had
in mind. one problem is how do you control the domestic population.
The great beast, as Alexander Hamilton called the people. They're
always a problem. The beast is always getting out of control. One of
the main problems of governance, I'm sure you study this in all of
your political science courses, is how do you keep the great beast in
a cage?
That's particularly difficult when you're dedicated passionately to
carrying out policies that are in fact going to be very harmful to the
mass of the population, and to future generations. Then it's
difficult, and only one effective way has ever been discovered by the
people in office now, or anyone else under those conditions, and that
is inspire fear. If you can do that, maybe you can get away with it.
And for the people in office now, it's second nature. It's important
to remember this.
It's kind of striking that it hasn't been discussed extensively,
but if you think for a minute, the people -- the present incumbents in
Washington are almost entirely recycled from the Reagan and first Bush
administration. In fact, from their more reactionary sectors, or else
their immediate teams, especially that administration. They're
following pretty much the same script as the first 12 years they had
in political power. In both domestically and internationally. You can
learn a lot about what they're doing by just paying attention to what
happened in those 12 years. They were in fact pursuing policies that
were highly unpopular. Reagan's policies were strongly opposed by the
population, but they did keep voting for him. Mainly out of fear. They
continually pressed the panic button every year or two. I'll come back
to that. Reagan in fact ended up in 1992 being the most unpopular
living U.S. president next to Nixon. Ranked slightly above Nixon, well
below Carter and even below the almost forgotten Ford. But they did
manage to hang on for 12 years, and they're following essentially the
same script. Well, except with much more arrogance and commitment and
optimism, feeling they can do things that they couldn't get away with
then for various reasons.
Well, let's go back to the other two major events of September, the
national security strategy and the invasion of Iraq. It was understood
that this is to be -- as The New York Times put it, after the war,
though it was obvious it was before, that this was to be the first
test of the national security strategy, not the last. The invasion of
Iraq, they pointed out, is the petri dish for an experiment in
preemptive attack. The term -- and that was understood around the
world. There was huge protest around the world, in the United States,
too, completely without any historical precedent, and it wasn't just
over the invasion of Iraq.
That was the same in Davos, it's the same in the foreign Policy
elite here. It was partly that, but more because of the general
strategy of which Iraq is to be an exemplary action. It's supposed to
create a new norm in international relations, which only those with
the guns can implement, of course. And it struck plenty of fear in the
world. That's mainly what the protest was about. Well, the phrase that
the Times used -- preemptive strike, preemptive attack -- is
conventional, but completely wrong.
Preemptive war has a meaning in international law. It's kind of on
the border of legality. If you think about the UN charter, it
authorizes the use of force under one condition -- two conditions,
either the Security Council calls for it, or in self-defense against
armed attack until the Security Council has a chance to act. And that
has a sort of fringe of judgment. So, for example, if, say, Russian
bombers were flying across the Atlantic with the obvious intent of
bombing the United States it would be legitimate under -- it would be
interpreted as legitimate under Article 51 to shoot them down before
they bomb. Maybe even to attack the base they were coming from. That's
a preemptive strike. It's a military action taken against an imminent
attack when no other possibility is open, and there's enough time to
notify the Security Council. That's preemptive war. But that's not
what's being proposed.
Sometimes it's called more accurately, preventive war, or
anticipatory self-defense. Well, that's at least not completely wrong,
but it's also mostly wrong. There's nothing that has to be prevented.
And there's no self-defense involved. The prevention is against an
imagined or invented threat. There was no threat of attack from Iraq.
That was farcical. What's called for is not even preventive war, as
the more cautious commentators point out, or anticipatory
self-defense. In fact, it's just straight, outright aggression. What
was called the supreme crime at Nuremberg, the most serious of all
crimes. That's what the doctrine announces. We have the right to carry
out the supreme crime of Nuremberg and we'll count on international
lawyers and respectable intellectuals to pretty it up and make it look
like something else. But, essentially, that's what it comes down to
and that's the way it was understood. It was understood here, too, by
people who care about the country. The most extreme condemnation of
the war that I came across was right from the middle of the mainstream
when the U.S. bombed -- when the bombing began, Arthur Schlesinger, a
very respectable senior American historian, highly respected, one of
Kennedy's advisers, had an article in which he said that the bombing
of Iraq resembles the actions of imperial Japan at Pearl Harbor on a
date, which the President at the time said, the date that will live in
infamy. And he said President Roosevelt was correct. It's a date that
will live in infamy, except that now it's Americans who live in
infamy, and the world knows it. That's the reason why the sympathy and
solidarity with the United States that was evident after 9-11 has
turned into a wave of revulsion and fear, and often hatred, which is
horrible in itself and also an extreme danger.
Well, he was not alone. The national security strategy aroused many
shudders worldwide. That included the foreign policy elite at home.
Right away, within weeks, the main establishment journal, Foreign
Affairs -- the Council on Foreign Relations, ran an article by a
well-known international relations scholar, in which he warned that
the imperial grand strategy, as he called it, posed great dangers to
the world, and to the population of the United States. The United
States was declaring itself, he said, to be a revisionist state that
is tearing to shreds the framework of international law and
institutions. And the effect of that is -- and hoping, expecting to be
able to permanently dominate the world by force, but he said, it's not
going to work. Aside from being wrong, it's going to lead to efforts
on the part of potential victims to counter it. They're not going to
sit there and wait to be destroyed. They can't compete with the United
States in military force -- nobody can -- but there are weapons of the
weak. Two primarily. One is weapons of mass destruction, which by now
are becoming weapons of the weak, and the other is terror.
So, he and many other foreign policy analysts and intelligence
agencies pointed out that the strategy is essentially calling for
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and increase in terror.
And hence, a great danger to the world altogether, but to the United
States in particular. The war in Iraq was understood exactly the same
way. The U.S. and British intelligence agencies -- the British ones
have just been exposed in the Hutton inquiry in London, but there were
enough leaks before. Both the British and the U.S. intelligence
agencies, and other intelligence agencies, and plenty of independent
analysts, and any one you pick, predicted that one likely consequence
of the Iraq invasion would be proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and terror.
Many commentators have pointed out that it's pretty likely that the
Iranian and North Korean actions, since our response to the threat of
the national security strategy and its implementation, are turning to
the weapons that are available to them -- weapons of mass destruction.
The U.S., indeed, made that very clear. There was a very clear and
ugly lesson taught to the world last winter. North Korea is a far more
vicious and ugly and dangerous state then Iraq, bad as Saddam Hussein
was. But the U.S. wasn't going to attack North Korea. It was going to
attack Iraq as the exemplary action. In part, that's because Iraq's
just a lot more important. It's right in the center of the
oil-producing region, but in part it's because Iraq was understood to
be completely defenseless. If you have any brains, you don't attack
anybody who can defend themselves. That's stupid. You want to attack
somebody that's completely defenseless, and Iraq was known to be
completely defenseless. That's why nobody was afraid of it, much as
they might have hated it.
North Korea, on the other hand, had a deterrent. The deterrent was
not nuclear weapons. It was conventional weapons -- massed artillery
on the DMZ, the border with South Korea. Extensive massed artillery
aimed at the capital, Seoul, South Korea, and at the U.S. troops in
the south. Unless the Pentagon can figure out a way to get rid of that
with precision weapons, or something or other, that is a deterrent to
a U.S. attack. In fact, U.S. troops have since been withdrawn from the
DMZ. And that's caused plenty of concern in both South and North Korea
and the region, suggesting a very cynical strategy. You can figure it
out. But what the U.S. was telling the world is if you don't want us
to attack you and destroy you, you better have some kind of deterrent.
And for most of the world, that's going to mean weapons of mass
destruction. And terror.
The result of the war, as far as we know, verified that
near-universal prediction of intelligence agencies and analysts. It's
been pointed out since, that, to quote a few, that the Iraq war was a
huge setback for the war on terror, led to a sharp spike in
recruitment for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and in fact Iraq
itself was turned into a haven for terrorists for the first time. It
wasn't before, but now it is.
That was expected and that's another dilemma of dominance. You have
to control the great beast at home, and while violence is an effective
device and may intimidate many people and countries, it's likely to
incite others -- to incite them to revenge or simply to find means of
deterrence. And since no one can think of competing with the United
States in military power, well, that leaves the weapons of the weak,
weapons of mass destruction, and terror, and those may sooner or later
be united. That's been predicted for years with contemporary
technology. It's not that hard for terrorist groups with a low level
of financing and sophistication to gain access to even nuclear
weapons, small nuclear weapons. The chances of -- the possibilities of
smuggling them into the United States are overwhelming. If you are
interested in having a sleepless night, you can read some of the
high-level studies that have been coming out for the past six or seven
years, well before 9-11, but increasingly, which are virtually
cookbooks for terrorists. I mean, they're the kind of things that I
suspect we could do if we wanted to.
And maybe impossible to stop for all kind of reasons. The
Hart-Rudman report, which came out about a year ago, Gary Hart and
Warren Rudman, two former senators, a high-level study of threats --
on threats of terror that gives one of many such examples. So, yeah,
sooner or later, weapons of mass destruction and terror will be
united. And the consequences could be quite horrific. Well, all of
that is the likely consequence predicted, and, so far, happening of
the security strategy in the test case, the dramatic test case to
illustrate it.
Well, administration planners know all of this as well as everyone
else. I mean, they're intelligent, literate. They read the same
intelligence reports everyone else does. So, they know, yes, the
policies they're carrying out are increasing the threat to the
security of the American people, and the world and, of course, future
generations. And they don't want that. They don't want that outcome.
It just doesn't matter very much. If you look at the ranking of
priorities, it just doesn't rank very high. Likely that it could
happen, but other things are just more important. The things that are
more important are establishing global hegemony and carrying out the
highly regressive domestic policies of trying to roll back the New
Deal and the progressive legislation of the past century, in fact. And
creating a very different kind of domestic society, one that most of
the public passionately opposes, but may accept under the threat of
destruction, manufactured and some increasingly real.
Well, this, again, gets back to the first dilemma, how do you
control the domestic public, the great beast? In particular, the
problem now is winning the 2004 election. Remember that they have a
very narrow hold on political power. You all know that the 2000
election was disputed. The 2002 election was barely -- barely managed
to sneak through, and now we're up to 2004, and what do we do with
that? Well, go back to last May. On the first of May, you remember,
there was a carefully staged extravaganza which elicited ridicule and
fear throughout the world, but was played pretty seriously here when
the President landed on the Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier wearing
combat gear and posing and so on and so forth. It was pretty
frightening for the world. Here it played pretty straight. He gave a
victory speech. We won a victory over in Iraq. Now, the front page
story in The New York Times used a phrase that I'll come back to, and
it's important. They said, "it was a powerful Reaganesque finale to
the war in Iraq." We'll come back to that.
More astute observers pointed out that the extravaganza was the
opening of the 2004 election campaign, which must be built on national
security themes. That's The Wall Street Journal. Karl Rove, same guy,
announced right away that the 2004 Election is -- the main theme is
going to have to be what he called the battle of Iraq, and he
emphasized battle. The battle of Iraq, not the war. It's an episode in
the war on terror, which must continue. And, in fact, if you look at
the President's declaration on the Abraham Lincoln, he said that we
have won a victory in the war on terror by removing an ally of Al
Qaeda. Notice that it's immaterial that there is not the slightest
evidence of any connection between Saddam Hussein and his bitter
enemy, Osama bin Laden, and the idea of a connection is dismissed by
every competent authority, including the intelligence agencies, but it
doesn't matter. It's a higher truth. All you have to do is repeat it
loudly enough and often enough. Facts are irrelevant. In particular,
the specific facts -- again, they didn't invent this formula. It's not
pleasant to think about the antecedents, but they're there. It's also
irrelevant, specifically, that there is actually a Connection between
the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq, and namely, the invasion
increased threat of terror, exactly as predicted. But it just doesn't
make any difference and it continues.
A week or so ago, in his weekly presidential radio address,
President Bush, September 28 said, "the world is safer today because
our coalition ended a regime that cultivated ties to terror while it
built weapons of mass destruction."
Well, his speechwriters and his minders and trainers know very well
that every word there was an outrageous lie. But why should it matter?
If you repeat it loudly enough, it will become the truth.
Well, how can Karl Rove hope to get away with it? Just have a look
back at what just happened in September 2002: the last election
campaign.
That, as I said, was the beginning of an onslaught of government
media propaganda, which had a very substantial effect. By the end of
the month, by the end of September, about 60% of the population
regarded Iraq as a serious threat to the security of the United
States.
Remember, the United States is alone in this respect. In Kuwait and
Iran, which Saddam invaded, they're not afraid of him. They're not
afraid of him because they know exactly what U.S. intelligence and
everyone else knows - Iraq was the weakest country in the region. It
had been devastated by the U.S. sanctions, which are called U.N.
sanctions, but if it wasn't for U.S. pressure, they wouldn't exist.
They wiped out the population. They happened to strengthen the tyrant,
but devastated the economy. The country was virtually disarmed. It was
under total surveillance. Its military budget was about a third that
of Kuwait, which has 10% of its population, and far below the other
states in the region, including, of course, the regional superpower,
which we're not allowed to talk about, because there's an offshore
U.S. military base, but outside the United States everyone knows there
is one country in the region that has extensive weapons of mass
destruction, and has military forces which according to its own
analysts are more technically advanced and more powerful than those of
any NATO country outside the United States, unmentionable here, but
known everywhere else.
That's the -- and Iraq isn't even in the league of Kuwaits, let
alone anything like that.
So it, wasn't -- certainly not a threat, but by the end of
September, as a result of a propaganda campaign of quite impressive
character, government campaign transmitted uncritically by the media,
about 60% of the population believed there was a threat. Then --
pretty soon after that, the proportion of the population that believed
that Iraq was involved in 9-11, maybe responsible for it, went up to
50% or higher, depended how you asked the question.
Also the belief that Iraq was -- had interrelations with al Qaeda
and other gross misperceptions which are rejected by every
intelligence agency, including the U.S.. But it did become -- it did
work domestically, not anywhere else.
That's the media -- the media behavior was kind of -- let me quote
a non-controversial source, the very respectable "Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists". The editor wrote recently, "the charges dangled in
front of the media failed the laugh test, but the more ridiculous they
were, the more the media strove to make whole-hearted swallowing of
them a test of patriotism."
It's pretty accurate and it sort of worked, only domestically and
-- and only in part, because it was because of part of the population.
The rest of the population was overwhelmingly opposed to the war at a
level that literally has no precedent, but it worked enough to sneak
by the election and to build up a base of support for the war. Not
surprisingly, a belief in these fantasies was highly correlated with
support for the war, as you would expect. If you believe those things,
they're right. Well, that's significant.
Congress, in October, right after the propaganda campaign began,
passed a resolution authorizing the government to resort to force to
defend the United States against the continuing threat of Iraq.
Again, remember, the United States is the only country that was
under that threat, but congress passed it. The media and commentators
and in the intellectual world were silent about the fact, I presume
they were aware of, that the congressional resolution was a copy.
They're still following the script.
In 1985, president Reagan declared a national emergency in the
United States because of -- I'm quoting, “the usual and extraordinary
threat to the security of the United States posed by the government of
Nicaragua.” Which was two days' driving time from Arlington, Texas.
We had the quake and fear before that. Notice, that's much more
severe than Iraq. That was an unusual and extraordinary threat.
In fact, Reagan went on to a press conference where he said that I
know the enormous odds against me, but I remember a man named
Churchill and he stood up against terrific odds, fought Hitler, and
I'm not going to give up, never, never, never, despite the hoards of
Nicaraguans invading us and about to conquer us.
That passed the laugh test in the United States. If you check back,
just report it. People were afraid. The rest of the world could not
believe it, but it happened, and it's another reason why they expect
that they can do it again. That helps explain the confidence.
It and wasn't the only case. Through the 1980's, year after year
there was one or another threat of that nature. Libyan hit-men were
wandering the streets of Washington about to assassinate our leader,
who was holed up in the White House, surrounded by tanks. The Russians
were going to build an airbase in the nutmeg capital of the world,
Grenada, if they could find it on a map, and they were going to bomb
us.
That brings us back to the New York Times phrase, "powerful
Reagan-esque finale."
What are they referring to? Well, they know what they're referring
to. They're referring to Reagan's speech after the United States -
after the brave cowboy barely saved us from destruction from the
Grenadians by sending thousands of forces who were able to overcome a
couple of middle aged construction workers and one -- but then there
was a speech saying, "we're standing tall.”
That's the powerful Reagan-esque finale that The New York Times
is referring to. Maybe the reporter is being ironic, I don't know, but
what gets to the public is the message, not what's in the person's
mind. The message is, “we're in constant danger.”
After Grenada, it was Libya again, and after that, it was domestic
threats.
George Bush Sr. won his election by straight pulling the race card.
Willie Horton, the black rapist is going to come after you, notice you
put me in. Crime in the United States is like other industrial
countries, but fear of crime is off the spectrum.
Same with drugs. Drugs - yeah - problem. In other countries it is
about the same as here, but fear of drugs is far higher here and it's
constantly manipulated by unscrupulous politicians and obedient media,
and you get continual hysteria about drugs and Nicaraguans on the
march, and Grenadians and the rest.
There's confidence. They were able to hold power for years, over
and over, despite the fact that the population was harmed by the
domestic policies and opposed them, but they stayed in office.
Now, they are much more confident. Well, there's quite a lot at
stake for them. It's not just a matter of narrow political gain.
What's at stake is world domination by force, and also control of the
major energy resources in the world, which is not a
small thing. [the incomplete transcript end here] |