| The US linguist and philosopher Noam Chomsky has
taken to the tranquillity of the Tuscan hills. His chosen retreat is
the secluded Certosa di Pontignano overlooking Siena, a finely
restored 13th-century Carthusian monastery now used by the university
as an exclusive international conference centre. As we are led through
the cloisters to a superbly frescoed reception room, he reveals that
the sublime silence is congenial to his hermitic nature and conducive
to serious thought.
I ask Chomsky how he feels academic freedom and the pursuit of
truth are faring in universities. Students, he replies, are not given
enough encouragement to challenge the basic assumptions of their
professors and the pre-established framework of their subject. He
accepts that the situation in Italy is particularly depressing but
points out that, when seen from a US perspective, it is true of
European universities generally, Britain included. But he stresses
that Britain is closer to the US than the continent in this respect.
'Continental Europe still retains a rather authoritarian structure
in the university system, with deference/authority relations built
into cultural patterns. I noticed it very strikingly when I was
teaching at Oxford. In the Oxford college where I was living there was
an incident over a man who was serving a young gentleman, and the way
he expected to be treated was just unimaginable.
'In the US, class differentiations are not particularly marked, so
that the guy who is fixing your car and you are on the same terms.'
He recounts a story about an MIT colleague who, when asked by his
students what they were going to cover in their courses, replied that
it didn't matter what they covered, but rather what they discovered.
'That's the way education should work,' he says. 'At the graduate
level in the sciences that's the way it does work. It's interaction
among students and faculty with not much tyranny -- there can't be,
because most of the good ideas are coming from the students.'
Mainstream academia, Chomsky complains, tends to be too resistant
to change. 'I think you see this very clearly in the way that modern
linguistics developed. It did not develop in the major academic
centres because they were too conservative. They don't want to be
rattled -- they want their peaceful existence to be unchallenged. And
that's why in France, where European linguistics took off, it was at
Vincennes and not the Sorbonne.
'It was in this little place outside Paris where they were sending
all the radical students to get rid of them, and since nobody was
paying attention to what happened there, it was possible to have
innovative creative work which to this day has not penetrated the
French university system. And the same pattern has replicated
throughout the world.'
But it is subordination to external power in both US and European
universities which he sees as posing perhaps the most serious threat.
'Universities are always in a tension. At best, they are trying to
maintain intellectual integrity. Yet they cannot escape the reality
that they are parasitic on external power mainly in the form of
government and private corporations. These outside pressures are
obviously going to undermine intellectual integrity and so it's a
constant battle.'
Over-generous funding for over-ambitious projects turns out to be a
characteristic speciality of US academia. Following Europe's
self-destruction in the second world war, Chomsky explains, the US
found itself with unprecedented power and prestige. This led to the
confidence, first expressed in the 1950s and still expressed today,
that with the US having conquered the world, its scientists could now
conquer the last frontier -- the human mind.
'We've just finished a 'decade of the brain' programme backed by
major foundations. The closing conference at the United Academy of
Arts and Sciences produced the very confident statement that the
body/mind problem will soon be overcome and that the mind will finally
be understood.
'Well, firstly, there is no such problem, because there has been no
coherent concept of body since Isaac Newton, so there's nothing to
overcome. And secondly, the confidence is completely misplaced since
we can't even explain how the human visual system can recognise a
straight line. The truth is that there's still a huge gap between
current understanding and the mental aspects of the world we're trying
to account for.'
Despite having revolutionised the way we think about language and
the mind and notwithstanding the considerable insights produced by
almost half a century of sustained research, Chomsky still finds his
work criticised outright as 'mentalistic' and therefore unscientific
on the grounds that it cannot be reduced to physics. Chemistry, he
argues, was not reducible to physics, but that didn't make it
unscientific. Rather, it was physics which had to be reconstituted so
as to be able to incorporate a virtually unchanged chemistry.
Many modern thinkers, he says, simply haven't understood the full
significance of Newton's discovery of gravity. 'The possibility of
affecting objects without touching them just exploded physicalism and
materialism. It has been common in recent years to ridicule
Descartes's 'ghost in the machine' in postulating mind as distinct
from body. Well, Newton came along and he did not exorcise the ghost
in the machine: he exorcised the machine and left the ghost intact. So
now the ghost is left and the machine isn't there. And the mind has
mystical properties.
'My feeling is that a study of the actual history of the modern
sciences would be a very salutary component of any university
curriculum.'
Chomsky acknowledges with a broad grin that these views have earned
his approach the trade name of 'MIT mentalism' among colleagues. But
why does the conception of the world as consisting in bodies and minds
have such a strong hold on people and why are so many academics
deceived into believing illusions about the physical that were
understood as such 200 years ago?
'So far we've been talking about fact, but now it's speculation. My
speculation is that somehow our intuitive mentality is fundamentally
dualist. Suppose you're looking at the sun setting over the ocean. You
can know all the relativity theory in the world, but you still see the
sun setting into the water. And if the moon is near the horizon, you
can't help seeing it larger than if it's up in the sky.'
So where does all of this leave truth, the cornerstone of all
academic research? Is there a final answer to the question: what is
truth? 'There is an answer,' says Chomsky, 'but whether we can find it
or not is another matter. The human condition is such that we can make
our best guess as to what is true. We're organic creatures and we have
our limitations. We must see the world from a particular point of view
because that's the way we're built.
'But we're also reflective creatures, so we can reflect on our own
inadequacies and try to overcome them. That's what happened in the
Newtonian revolution. They had to reflect on the inability of common
sense, of ordinary intelligence to comprehend the nature of the world
and look at it from a different point of view. It's the same with all
our existence. We can use our resources as creatively and critically
as we can to try to overcome our special perspectives that come from
our nature. But whether we'll get the truth or not is another
question.'
Meanwhile, Chomsky's new minimalist programme in linguistics is
asking just how well designed the human language capacity is to carry
out its essential functions. With complex grammar rules now eliminated
in favour of basic principles, he feels that more has been learnt
about language in the last 20 years than in the preceeding 2,000
years.
The trouble is, he says, that what we know intuitively seems to lie
far beyond what we can understand intellectually. |