| John Dean's list of enemies has elicited
indignation and flippancy. Justifiable responses, no doubt, but
inadequate ones. Suppose there had been no Thomas Watson [of IBM] or
James Reston [of the New York Times] or McGeorge Bundy on the
White House hate list. Suppose that the list had been limited to true
political dissidents, antiwar activists, radicals. Then, one can be
sure, there would have been no front page story in the New York
Times and little attention on the part of the respectable
political commentators. But the gang of petty thieves who had taken
temporary control over the state executive violated the rules of the
game. They were attacking the political center. Their targets included
the rich and respectable, spokesmen for official ideology, men who are
expected to share power, to design social policy and mold popular
opinion. Such people are not fair game for persecution at the hands of
the state.
The reaction to the Watergate affair in general exhibits the same
moral flaw. What CREEP was trying to do to the Democrats is
insignificant in comparison with the bipartisan attack on the
Communist Party in the post-war era. Judicial and other harassment of
dissidents and their organizations is the common practice, whoever
happens to be in office. Serious civil rights or antiwar groups have
regularly discovered government provocateurs among their most militant
members.
Watergate is different only in that some of the familiar bipartisan
tactics were applied against one of the two components of what has
occasionally been called "the Property Party," one of the two
candidate-producing organizations that masquerade as political.
A true hypocrite might argue that the state attack on political
dissent has generally been within the bounds o the law -- at least, as
the courts have interpreted the constitution -- whereas the Watergate
antics were plainly illegal. But surely it is clear that those who
have the power to impose their interpretation of "legitimacy" will so
construct and construe the legal system as to permit them to root out
their enemies.
The mistake of the Watergate conspirators was that they failed to
heed the lesson of the McCarthy hearings twenty years ago. It is one
thing to attack the Left, the pitiful remnants of the Communist Party,
a collapsing liberal opposition that had capitulated in advance by
accepting -- in fact, creating -- the instruments of postwar
repression, or elements in the bureaucracy that might impede the state
policy of counterrevolutionary intervention and enforcement of global
order; it is something else again to turn the same weapons against the
U.S. Army. Having failed to make this subtle distinction, McCarthy was
quickly destroyed. Nixon's cohorts, as recent exposures have amply
demonstrated, have fallen into the same error of judgment.
The Watergate caper and the sordid story that has since been
revealed are not without significance. They indicate, once again, how
frail are the barriers to some form of fascism in a state capitalist
system in crisis. Fortunately for us and for the world, McCarthy was a
mere thug and Nixon's mafia overstepped the bounds of acceptable
trickery and deceit with such obtuseness and blundering vulgarity that
they were quickly called to account by powerful forces.
Nixon's front men now plead that in 1969-70 the country was on the
verge of insurrection and that it was therefore necessary to stretch
the Constitutional limits. The turmoil of those years was largely a
reaction to U.S. efforts to crush the forces of revolutionary
nationalism in Indochina. The basic premises of that policy are
largely shared by most of the enemies on the Dean-Colson list. And the
conditions, domestic and international, that have led successive
Administrations to guide "Third World Development" into the particular
channels that suit the needs of industrial capitalism have not
changed. There is every reason to suppose that similar considerations
will impel their successors to implement the same policies, choosing
their domestic enemies more judiciously and preparing the ground more
thoroughly.
The reaction to Watergate illustrates the dangers well enough. In
the midst of the Watergate exposures, Ambassador Godley testified
before Congress that 15,000-20,000 Thai mercenaries had been employed
by the U.S. in Laos, in direct and explicit violation of Congressional
legislation. The confirmation of Pathet Lao charges that had been
largely ignored or ridiculed in the West evoked little editorial
comment or public indignation, though it is a far more serious matter
than anything revealed at the Ervin hearings.
Liberal commentators sigh with relief that Kissinger has barely
been tainted -- a bit of questionable wiretapping, but no close
involvement in the Watergate shenanigans. Yet by any objective
standards the man is one of the great mass murderers of modern times.
He presided over the expansion of the war to Cambodia (with
consequences that are now well-known) and the vicious escalation of
the bombings of Laos, not to speak of the atrocities committed in
Vietnam as he sought to achieve a victory of some sort for imperial
power in Indochina. But he wasn't implicated in the burglary at the
Watergate or the undermining of Muskie, so his hands are clean.
If we try to keep a sense of balance, the exposures of the past
several months are analogous to the discovery that the directors of
Murder, Inc. were also cheating on their income tax. Reprehensible, to
be sure, but hardly the main point. |