The Setting
The U.S. Impact on Indochina
The U.S. war in Indochina began as one of innumerable examples of
counterrevolutionary intervention throughout the world. As a result of
the wholly unanticipated level of resistance of the Vietnamese
revolutionaries, and later their allies when the United States spread
the war to the rest of Indochina, it was gradually transformed into
one of the most destructive and murderous attacks on a civilian
population in history, as the world's most powerful military machine
was unleashed against peasant societies with extremely limited means
of self-defense and lacking the capacity to strike back at the source
of aggression.
The main outlines of the U.S. war are well documented. After World War
II, the United States determined to back French imperialism in its
effort to destroy what planners clearly recognized to be an indigenous
nationalist movement in Vietnam, which declared independence in 1945
and vainly sought recognition and aid from the United States. The
French-U.S. repacification effort failed. In 1954, France accepted a
political settlement at Geneva, which, if adhered to by the United
States, would have led to independence for the three countries of
Indochina. Unwilling to accept the terms of this settlement, the
United States undertook at once to subvert them. A client regime was
established in South Vietnam which immediately rejected the basic
framework of the agreements, launched a fierce repression in the
South, and refused to permit the elections to unify the two
administrative zones of the country as laid down in the Geneva Accords
... In the 1950s, the United States still hoped to be able to
reconquer all of Vietnam; later, it limited its aims to maintaining
control over South Vietnam and incorporating it into the Free World by
any necessary means. Direct involvement of U.S. armed forces in
military action against the South Vietnamese began in 1961-62.
Meanwhile in Laos the United States also successfully undermined the
Geneva political settlement and prevented any sharing of power by the
Pathet Lao, the left wing resistance forces that had fought the French
and won the 1958 election despite a major U.S. effort to prevent this
outcome. The United States then turned to subversion and fraud,
setting off a civil war in which, as in South Vietnam, the right wing
military backed by the United States was unable to hold its own.
Meanwhile, Cambodia was able to maintain independence despite
continual harassment by U.S. clients in Thailand and South Vietnam and
an unsuccessful effort at subversion in the late 1950s.
By the early 1960s, virtually all parties concerned, apart from the
United States and its various local clients, were making serious
efforts to avoid an impending war by neutralizing South Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia; that is, removing them from external (overwhelmingly
U.S.) influence and control. Such an outcome was anathema to the U.S.
Ieadership. President Johnson informed Ambassador Lodge in 1964 that
his mission was "knocking down the idea of neutralization wherever it
rears its ugly head." The United States was deeply concerned to
prevent any negotiated political settlement because, as is easily
documented, its planners and leaders assumed that the groups that they
backed could not possibly survive peaceful competition.
Once again the United States succeeded in preventing a peaceful
settlement. In South Vietnam, it stood in opposition to all
significant political forces, however anti-Communist, imposing the
rule of a military clique that was willing to serve U.S. interests. By
January 1965, the United States was compelled to undermine its own
puppet, General Khanh; he was attempting to form what Ambassador
Taylor called a "dangerous" coalition with the Buddhists, who were not
acting "in the interests of the Nation," as General Westmoreland
explained. What is more, Khanh was apparently trying to make peace
with the NLF, quite possibly a factor that lay behind the elimination
of his predecessors. At that point, the United States, which stood
alone in understanding "the interests of the Nation" in South Vietnam,
had no alternative but to extend its already substantial military
campaign against the rural society of the South, where the
overwhelming majority of the population lived. The United States
therefore launched a full-scale invasion in a final effort to destroy
the organized popular forces in the South. The invasion was
accompanied by the bombing of North Vietnam, undertaken to lay some
basis for the claim that the United States was "defending the South
against external aggression," and in the hope that the DRV would use
its influence to bring the southern rebellion to a halt and permit the
United States to attain its goals. This maneuver failed. The DRV
responded by sending limited forces to the South, as most U.S.
planners had anticipated. Meanwhile, the United States began the
systematic bombing of South Vietnam, at three times the level of the
more publicized-and more protested-bombing of the North.
The war also intensified in Laos, with U.S. bombing from 1964 and
military operations by a "clandestine army" of Meo tribesmen,
organized and directed by the CIA to supplement the inept "official"
army trained and armed by the U.S. military. U.S. outposts in northern
Laos were guiding the bombing of North Vietnam from Thai bases. By
this time Thai and North Vietnamese forces were also engaged, though
on a considerably smaller scale. By 1968, the United States was
conducting a bombing campaign of extraordinary severity in northern
Laos, far removed from the war in South Vietnam. By 1969 the sporadic
U.S.-Saigon attacks on Cambodia had escalated to intensive
bombardment, and after the coup of March, 1970, which
overthrewtheSihanoukgovernment, Cambodia too was plunged into the
inferno. U.S.-Saigon military actions began two days after the coup
and a full-scale invasion (called a "limited incursion") took place at
the end of April- "limited," as it turned out, largely because of the
unprecedented demonstration of protest in the United States. This
invasion and the subsequent bombing, particularly in 1973, led to vast
suffering and destruction throughout the country.
All of these efforts failed. In January, 1973 the United States s~gned
a peace treaty in Paris which virtually recapitulated the NLF program
of the early 1960s. This was interpreted as a stunning diplomatic
victory in the United States. The United States government announced
at once that it would disregard every essential provision of this
treaty, and proceeded to do so, attempting again to conquer South
Vietnam, now through the medium of the vastly expanded military forces
it organized, trained, advised, and supplied. In a most remarkable
display of servility, the Free Press misrepresented the new agreement
in accordance with the Kissinger-Nixon version, which was
diametrically opposed to the text on every crucial point, thus failing
to bring out the significance of the U.S.-Thieu subversion of the
major elements of the agreement. This misrepresentation of the actual
terms of the agreement set the stage for indignation at the North
Vietnamese response and the sudden collapse of the puppet regime.
All of these U.S. efforts dating back to the 1940s eventually failed.
By April 1975, U.S. clients had been defeated in all parts of
Indochina, leaving incredible carnage, bitterness, and near insoluble
problems of reconstruction. The United States thereafter refused
reparations or aid, and exerted its considerable influence to block
assistance from elsewhere. Even trade is blocked by the United States,
in a striking display of malice.
*****
The United States in Vietnam: A Partial Victory
The war in Vietnam ended with a defeat for U.S. imperial violence, but
only a partial defeat-a significant fact. The U.S. Expeditionary Force
of over half a million men in South Vietnam became "a drugged,
mutinous and demoralised rabble"5 and was withdrawn. U.S. Ieaders had
painfully learned a lesson familiar to their predecessors: a conscript
army is ill-suited to fight a colonial war with its inevitable
barbarism and incessant atrocities against helpless civilians. Such a
war is better left to hired killers such as the French Foreign Legion
or native mercenaries, or in the modern period to an advanced
technology that leaves some psychic distance between the murderers and
their victims-although even B-52 pilots reportedly began to object
when Nixon and Kissinger dispatched them to devastate Hanoi in
December, 1972 in a final effort to compel the North Vietnamese to
accept a U.S.-dictated peace.
*****
Precedents
The Intelligentsia and the State
In considering the refraction of events in Indochina through l the
prism of western ideology, it is useful to bear in mind some relevant
precedents. The first class of precedents has to do with the ways in
which influential segments of the intelligentsia have responded in the
past to abuses of state power; the second, with the record of
treatment of former enemies after revolutionary, civil or other
military conflicts.
***
The normal case of straight chauvinist bias is, of course, of central
importance in shaping, the responses and defining the role of
mainstream intellectuals ... A primary social role of the group that
Isaiah Berlin called "the secular priesthood" is to speak positively
of the institutions and objectives of the state and dominant power
interests within it in order to help mobilize public commitment and
loyalty. The adaptability of intellectuals to quality variation in the
social order for which devotion is sought has proven to be very
great-the pre-Civil War southern intelligentsia even found the slave
system worth cherishing despite its economic inefficiency ("slave
labor can never be so cheap as what is called free labor") on the
grounds of its sheer humanity and social beneficence ("what is lost to
us [from inefficiency] is gained by humanity").
A further traditional role of intellectuals is to disseminate
propaganda concerning the evil practices, real or fabricated, of
current enemies of the state.
***
The general subservience of the articulate intelligentsia to the
framework of state propaganda is not only unrecognized, it is )
strenuously denied by the propaganda system. The press and the
intelligentsia in general are held to be fiercely independent,
critical, antagonistic to the state, even suffused by a trendy
anti-Americanism. It is quite true that controversy rages over
government policies and the errors or even crimes of government
officials and agencies. But the impression of internal dissidence is
misleading. A more careful analysis shows that this controversy takes
place, for the most part, within the narrow limits of a set of
patriotic premises. Thus it is quite tolerable-indeed, a contribution
to the propaganda system-for the Free Press to denounce the government
for its "errors" in attempting"to defend South Vietnam from North
Vietnamese aggression," since by so doing it helps to establish more
firmly the basic myth: that the United States was not engaged in a
savage attack on South Vietnam but was rather "defending" it. If even
the hostile critics adopt these assumptions, then clearly they must be
true.
The beauty of the democratic systems of thought control, as contrasted
with their clumsy totalitarian counterparts, is that they operate by
subtly establishing on a voluntary basis-aided by the force of
nationalism and media control by substantial interests-
presuppositions that set the limits of debate, rather than by imposing
beliefs with a bludgeon. Then let the debate rage; the more lively and
vigorous it is, the better the propaganda system is served, since the
presuppositions (U.S. benevolence, lack of rational imperial goals,
defensive posture, etc.) are more firmly established. Those who do not
accept the fundamental principles of state propaganda are simply
excluded from the debate (or if noticed, dismissed as "emotional,"
"irresponsible," etc.).
In a typical example, when the New York Times (5 April 1975) gave its
retrospective assessment of the Vietnam tragedy, it referred to "the
decade of fierce polemics" (to be resolved in due course by "Clio, the
goddess of history") between the hawks who thought that the United
States could win and the doves who were convinced that the U.S.
objective was unattainable. Those who opposed the war in
principle-specifically, the mainstream of the peace movement-were
simply not part of the debate, as far as the Times was concerned.
Their position need not be refuted; it does not exist.
An excellent illustration of how the ideological institutions operate
to buttress the state propaganda system by identifying the media as
"hypercritical," so much so as to endanger "free institutions," is
provided by a two-volume Freedom House study of the alleged bias and
incompetence of the media in portraying the Tet offensive as a defeat
for the United States and thus contributing to the failure of U.S.
arms by their excessive pessimism. The name "Freedom House" should at
once arouse a certain skepticism among people attuned to the
machinations of modern propaganda systems, just as any good student of
Orwell should have realized that a change in the name of the U.S. War
Department to "Defense Department" in 1947 signalled that henceforth
the state would be shifting from defense to aggressive war. In fact,
"Freedom House" is no less of an Orwellian construction, as its record
indicates.
The study in question is in the Freedom House tradition. Contrary to
its intentions and stated conclusions, any independent-minded reader
should infer from its 1500 pages of text and documents that the media
were remarkably loyal to the basic doctrines of the state and tended
to view the events of the period strictly from the government's point
of view. But these facts, though obvious from the documents cited,
completely escaped the author and his Freedom House sponsors;
naturally, since they take ordinary press subservience as a norm. What
is most striking about the study, apart from its general ineptitude,
are the premises adopted without comment throughout: the press is
unjustifiably "pessimistic" if it tends to believe that U.S. force may
not prevail in "defending South Vietnam," and is "optimistic" if it
expresses faith in the ultimate success of U.S. state violence.
Pessimism is wrong even if based on fact and in conformity with the
views of the Pentagon and CIA (as was often the case, specifically, in
the instance in question). Since optimism is demanded irrespective of
facts, the implication of this study is that "responsible" media must
deliberately lie in order to serve the state in an undeviatingly
propagandistic role.
... the intelligentsia have been prone to various forms of state
worship, the most striking and significant being subservience to the
propaganda systems of their own government and social institutions.
This subservience often takes the form of childish credulity that is
effectively exploited by the organizations that are devoted to
atrocity fabrication and other modes of ideological control. Sometimes
the credulity is feigned, as the propagandist knowingly transmits a
useful lie ...
*****
Final Comments
***
... For the groups that dominate economic, social, political and
intellectual life in the United States, it is a matter of urgency to
ensure that no serious challenge is raised to their predominant role,
either in ideology or in practice. While mild social reforms have been
introduced in the United States, others now conventional in Western
Europe (e.g., national health insurance, minimal "worker
participation" in industry, etc.) have been effectively resisted here,
and there has been remarkable success in designing policy so that
state intervention in the economy and social life serves the needs of
the wealthy and powerful... the absence of an organized left
opposition in the United States has facilitated the work of the system
of thought control and indoctrination. U.S. ideologists have been
unusually successful in conducting "the engineering of consent," a
technique of control that substitutes for the use of force in
societies with democratic forms.' To serve this end, every effort must
be made to discredit what is called "socialism" or "commumism".
***
There is no single cause for the misery and oppression that we find in
every part of the world. But there are some major causes, and some of
these are close at hand and subject to our influence and, ultimately,
our control. These factors and the social matrix in which they are
embedded will engage the concern and efforts of people who are
honestly committed to alleviate human suffering and to contribute to
freedom and justice.
The success of the Free Press in reconstructing imperial
ideology.since the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina has been
spectacular. The shift of the United States from causal agent to
concerned bystander-and even to leader in the world struggle for human
rights-in the face of its empire of client fascism and long, vicious
assault on the peasant societies of Indochina, is a remarkable
achievement. The system of brainwashing under freedom, with mass media
voluntary self-censorship in accord with the larger interests of the
state, has worked brilliantly. The new propaganda line has been
established by endless repetition of the Big Distortions and
negligible grant of access to nonestablishment points of view; all
rendered more effective by the illusion of equal access and the free
flow of ideas. U.S. dissenters can produce their Samizdats freely, and
stay out of jail, but they do not reach the general public or the Free
Press except on an episodic basis. This reflects the power and
interests that benefit from the uncontrolled arms race, the status quo
of domestic economic arrangements, and the external system of
multinational expansion and collaboration with the Shahs, Suhartos,
Marcos's in the contemporary "development" and sacking of the Third
World. Change will come only when material facts arouse sufficient
numbers to force a reassessment of policy. At the present time, the
machine expands, the mass media adapt to the political economy, and
human rights are set aside except in rhetorical flourishes useful for
ideological reconstruction.
|