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Crisis in the Balkans
Z Magazine, May, 1999
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On
March 24, U.S.-led NATO forces launched cruise missiles and bombs at
targets in Yugoslavia, “plunging America into a military conflict that
President Clinton said was necessary to stop ethnic cleansing and
bring stability to Eastern Europe,” lead stories in the press
reported. In a televised address, Clinton explained that by bombing
Yugoslavia, “we are upholding our values, protecting our interests,
and advancing the cause of peace.”
In the
preceding year, according to Western sources, about 2,000 people had
been killed in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo and there were several
hundred thousand internal refugees. The humanitarian catastrophe was
overwhelmingly attributable to Yugoslav military and police forces,
the main victims being ethnic Albanian Kosovars, commonly said to
constitute about 90 percent of the population. After three days of
bombing, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, several
thousand refugees had been expelled to Albania and Macedonia, the two
neighboring countries. Refugees reported that the terror had reached
the capital city of Pristina, largely spared before, and provided
credible accounts of large-scale destruction of villages,
assassinations, and a radical increase in generation of refugees,
perhaps an effort to expel a good part of the Albanian population.
Within two weeks the flood of refugees had reached some 350,000,
mostly from the southern sections of Kosovo adjoining Macedonia and
Albania, while unknown numbers of Serbs fled north to Serbia to escape
the increased violence from the air and on the ground.
On March 27,
U.S.-NATO Commanding General Wesley Clark declared that it was
“entirely predictable” that Serbian terror and violence would
intensify after the NATO bombing. On the same day, State Department
spokesperson James Rubin said that “The United States is extremely
alarmed by reports of an escalating pattern of Serbian attacks on
Kosovar Albanian civilians,” now attributed in large part to
paramilitary forces mobilized after the bombing. General Clark’s
phrase “entirely predictable” is an overstatement. Nothing is
“entirely predictable,” surely not the effects of extreme violence.
But he is surely correct in implying that what happened at once was
highly likely. As observed by Carnes Lord of the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, formerly a Bush Administration national security
adviser, “enemies often react when shot at,” and “though Western
officials continue to deny it, there can be little doubt that the
bombing campaign has provided both motive and opportunity for a wider
and more savage Serbian operation than what was first envisioned.”
In the preceding months, the threat of
NATO bombing—again, predictably—was followed by an increase in
atrocities. The withdrawal of international observers, sharply
condemned by the Serb Parliament, predictably had the same
consequence. The bombing was then undertaken under the rational
expectation that killing and refugee generation would escalate as a
result, as indeed happened, even if the scale may have come as a
surprise to some, though apparently not the commanding general.
Under Tito,
Kosovars had had a considerable measure of self-rule. So matters
remained until 1989, when Kosovo’s autonomy was rescinded by Slobodan
Milosevic, who established direct Serbian rule and imposed “a Serbian
version of Apartheid,” in the words of former U.S. government
specialist on the Balkans James Hooper, no dove: he advocates direct
NATO invasion of Kosovo. The Kosovars “confounded the international
community,” Hooper continues, “by eschewing a war of national
liberation, embracing instead the nonviolent approach espoused by
leading Kosovo intellectual Ibrahim Rugova and constructing a parallel
civil society,” an impressive achievement, for which they were
rewarded by “polite audiences and rhetorical encouragement from
Western governments.” The nonviolent strategy “lost its credibility”
at the Dayton accords in November 1995, Hooper observes. At Dayton,
the U.S. effectively partitioned Bosnia-Herzegovina between an
eventual greater Croatia and greater Serbia, after having roughly
equalized the balance of terror by providing arms and training for the
forces of Croatian dictator Tudjman and supporting his violent
expulsion of Serbians from Krajina and elsewhere. With the sides more
or less balanced, and exhausted, the U.S. took over, displacing the
Europeans who had been assigned the dirty work much to their
annoyance. “In deference to Milosevic,” Hooper writes, the U.S.
“excluded Kosovo Albanian delegates” from the Dayton negotiations and
“avoided discussion of the Kosovo problem.” “The reward for
nonviolence was international neglect”; more accurately, U.S. neglect.
Recognition
that the U.S. understands only force led to “the rise of the guerrilla
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and expansion of popular support for an
armed independence struggle.” By February 1998, KLA attacks against
Serbian police stations led to a “Serbian crackdown” and retaliation
against civilians, another standard pattern: Israeli atrocities in
Lebanon, particularly under Nobel Peace laureate Shimon Peres, are or
should be a familiar example, though one that is not entirely
appropriate. These Israeli atrocities are typically in response to
attacks on its military forces occupying foreign territory in
violation of longstanding Security orders to withdraw. Many Israeli
attacks are not retaliatory at all, including the 1982 invasion that
devastated much of Lebanon and left 20,000 civilians dead (a different
story is preferred in U.S. commentary, though the truth is familiar in
Israel). We need scarcely imagine how the U.S. would respond to
attacks on police stations by a guerrilla force with foreign bases and
supplies.
Fighting in
Kosovo escalated, the scale of atrocities corresponding roughly to the
resources of violence. An October 1998 cease-fire made possible the
deployment of 2,000 European monitors. Breakdown of U.S.-Milosevic
negotiations led to renewed fighting, which increased with the threat
of NATO bombing and the withdrawal of the monitors, again as
predicted. Officials of the UN refugee agency and Catholic Relief
Services had warned that the threat of bombing “would imperil the
lives of tens of thousands of refugees believed to be hiding in the
woods,” predicting “tragic” consequences if “NATO made it impossible
for us to be here.”
Atrocities
then sharply escalated as the late March bombing provided “motive and
opportunity,” as was surely “predictable,” if not “entirely” so.
The bombing
was undertaken, under U.S. initiative, after Milosevic had refused to
accept a U.S. ultimatum, the Rambouillet agreement of the NATO powers
in February. There were disagreements within NATO, captured in a
New York Times headline that reads: “Trickiest Divides Are Among
Big Powers at Kosovo Talks.” One problem had to do with deployment of
NATO peacekeepers. The European powers wanted to ask the Security
Council to authorize the deployment, in accord with treaty obligations
and international law. Washington, however, refused to allow the
“neuralgic word ‘authorize’,” the New York Times reported,
though it did finally permit “endorse.” The Clinton administration
“was sticking to its stand that NATO should be able to act
independently of the United Nations.”
The discord
within NATO continued. Apart from Britain (by now, about as much of an
independent actor as the Ukraine was in pre-Gorbachev years), NATO
countries were skeptical of Washington’s preference for force, and
annoyed by Secretary of State Albright’s “saber-rattling,” which they
regarded as “unhelpful when negotiations were at such a sensitive
stage,” though “U.S. officials were unapologetic about the hard line.”
Turning from
generally uncontested fact to speculation, we may ask why events
proceeded as they did, focusing on the decisions of U.S. planners—the
factor that must be our primary concern on elementary moral grounds,
and that is a leading if not decisive factor on grounds of equally
elementary considerations of power.
We may note
at first that the dismissal of Kosovar democrats “in deference to
Milosevic” is hardly surprising. To mention another example, after
Saddam Hussein’s repeated gassing of Kurds in 1988, in deference to
its friend and ally the U.S. barred official contacts with Kurdish
leaders and Iraqi democratic dissidents, who were largely excluded
from the media as well. The official ban was renewed immediately after
the Gulf war, in March 1991, when Saddam was tacitly authorized to
conduct a massacre of rebelling Shi’ites in the south and then Kurds
in the north. The massacre proceeded under the steely gaze of Stormin’
Norman Schwartzkopf, who explained that he was “suckered” by Saddam,
not anticipating that Saddam might carry out military actions with the
military helicopters he was authorized by Washington to use. The Bush
administration explained that support for Saddam was necessary to
preserve “stability,” and its preference for a military dictatorship
that would rule Iraq with an “iron fist” just as Saddam had done was
sagely endorsed by respected U.S. commentators.
Tacitly
acknowledging past policy, Secretary of State Albright announced in
December 1998 that “we have come to the determination that the Iraqi
people would benefit if they had a government that really represented
them.” A few months earlier, on May 20, Albright had informed
Indonesian President Suharto that he was no longer “our kind of guy,”
having lost control and disobeyed IMF orders, so that he must resign
and provide for “a democratic transition.” A few hours later, Suharto
transferred formal authority to his hand-picked vice-president. We now
celebrate the May 1999 elections in Indonesia, hailed by Washington
and the press as the first democratic elections in 40 years—but
without a reminder of the major U.S. clandestine military operation 40
years ago that brought Indonesian democracy to an end, undertaken in
large measure because the democratic system was unacceptably open,
even allowing participation of the left.
We need not
tarry on the plausibility of Washington’s discovery of the merits of
democracy in the past few months; the fact that the words can be
articulated, eliciting no comment, is informative enough. In any
event, there is no reason to be surprised at the disdain for
non-violent democratic forces in Kosovo; or at the fact that the
bombing was undertaken with the likely prospect that it would
undermine a courageous and growing democratic movement in Belgrade,
now probably demolished as Serbs are “unified from heaven—but by the
bombs, not by God,” in the words of Aleksa Djilas, the historian son
of Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas. “The bombing has jeopardized the
lives of more than 10 million people and set back the fledgling forces
of democracy in Kosovo and Serbia,” having “blasted...[its]
germinating seeds and insured that they will not sprout again for a
very long time,” according to Serbian dissident Veran Matic, editor in
chief of the independent station Radio B-92 (now banned). Former
Boston Globe editor Randolph Ryan, who has been working for years
in the Balkans and living in Belgrade, writes that “Now, thanks to
NATO, Serbia has overnight become a totalitarian state in a frenzy of
wartime mobilization,” as NATO must have expected, just as it “had to
know that Milosevic would take immediate revenge by redoubling his
attacks in Kosovo,” which NATO would have no way to stop.
As to what
planners “envisioned,” Carnes Lord’s confidence is hard to share. If
the documentary record of past actions is any guide, planners probably
were doing what comes naturally to those with a strong card—in this
case violence. Namely, play it, and then see what happens.
With the
basic facts in mind, one may speculate about how Washington’s
decisions were made. Turbulence in the Balkans qualifies as a
“humanitarian crisis,” in the technical sense: it might harm the
interests of rich and privileged people, unlike slaughters in Sierra
Leone or Angola, or crimes we support or conduct ourselves. The
question, then, is how to control the authentic crisis. The U.S. will
not tolerate the institutions of world order, so the problems have to
be handled by NATO, which the U.S. pretty much dominates. The
divisions within NATO are understandable: violence is Washington’s
strong card. It is necessary to guarantee the “credibility of
NATO”—meaning, of U.S. violence: others must have proper fear of the
global hegemon. “One unappealing aspect of nearly any alternative” to
bombing, Barton Gellman observed in a Washington Post review of
“the events that led to the confrontation in Kosovo,” “was the
humiliation of NATO and the United States.” National Security Adviser
Samuel Berger “listed among the principal purposes of bombing ‘to
demonstrate that NATO is serious’.” A European diplomat concurred:
“Inaction would have involved ‘a major cost in credibility,
particularly at this time as we approach the NATO summit in
celebration of its fiftieth anniversary’.” “To walk away now would
destroy NATO’s credibility,” Prime Minister Tony Blair informed
Parliament. Blair is not concerned with the credibility of Italy or
Belgium, and understands “credibility” in the manner of any Mafia Don.
Violence may fail, but planners can be confident that there is always more in reserve. Side benefits include an escalation of arms production and sales—the cover for the massive state role in the high tech economy for years. Just as bombing unites Serbs behind Milosevic, it unites Americans behind Our Leaders. These are standard effects of violence; they may not last for long, but planning is for the short term.
The Issues
There are
two fundamental issues: (1) What are the accepted and applicable
“rules of world order”? (2) How do these or other considerations apply
in the case of Kosovo?
(1) There is
a regime of international law and international order, binding on all
states, based on the UN Charter and subsequent resolutions and World
Court decisions. In brief, the threat or use of force is banned unless
explicitly authorized by the Security Council after it has determined
that peaceful means have failed, or in self-defense against “armed
attack” (a narrow concept) until the Security Council acts.
There is, of
course, more to say. Thus, there is at least a tension, if not an
outright contradiction, between the rules of world order laid down in
the UN Charter and the rights articulated in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UD), a second pillar of the world order established
under U.S. initiative after World War II. The Charter bans force
violating state sovereignty; the UD guarantees the rights of
individuals against oppressive states. The issue of “humanitarian
intervention” arises from this tension. It is the right of
“humanitarian intervention” that is claimed by the U.S./NATO in
Kosovo, with the general support of editorial opinion and news
reports.
The question
was addressed at once in a New York Times report headed: “Legal
Scholars Support Case for Using Force.” One example is offered: Allen
Gerson, former counsel to the U.S. mission to the UN. Two other legal
scholars are cited. One, Ted Galen Carpenter, “scoffed at the
Administration argument” and dismissed the alleged right of
intervention. The third is Jack Goldsmith, a specialist on
international law at Chicago Law school. He says that critics of the
NATO bombing “have a pretty good legal argument,” but “many people
think [an exception for humanitarian intervention] does exist as a
matter of custom and practice.” That summarizes the evidence offered
to justify the favored conclusion stated in the headline.
Goldsmith’s
observation is reasonable, at least if we agree that facts are
relevant to the determination of “custom and practice.” We may also
bear in mind a truism: the right of humanitarian intervention, if it
exists, is premised on the “good faith” of those intervening, and that
assumption is based not on their rhetoric but on their record, in
particular their record of adherence to the principles of
international law, World Court decisions, and so on. That is indeed a
truism, at least with regard to others. Consider, for example, Iranian
offers to intervene in Bosnia to prevent massacres at a time when the
West would not do so. These were dismissed with ridicule (in fact,
generally ignored); if there was a reason beyond subordination to
power, it was because Iranian good faith could not be assumed. A
rational person then asks obvious questions: is the Iranian record of
intervention and terror worse than that of the U.S.? And other
questions, for example: How should we assess the “good faith” of the
only country to have vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on
all states to obey international law? What about its historical
record? Unless such questions are prominent on the agenda of
discourse, an honest person will dismiss it as mere allegiance to
doctrine. A useful exercise is to determine how much of the
literature—media or other—survives such elementary conditions as
these.
(2) When the
decision was made to bomb, there had been a serious humanitarian
crisis in Kosovo for a year. In such cases, outsiders have three
choices:
(I) try to
escalate the catastrophe
(II) do
nothing
(III) try to
mitigate the catastrophe
The choices
are illustrated by other contemporary cases. Let’s keep to a few of
approximately the same scale, and ask where Kosovo fits into the
pattern.
(A)
Colombia. In Colombia, according to State Department estimates, the
annual level of political killing by the government and its
paramilitary associates is about at the level of Kosovo, and refugee
flight primarily from their atrocities is well over a million, another
300,000 last year. Colombia has been the leading Western hemisphere
recipient of U.S. arms and training as violence increased through the
1990s, and that assistance is now increasing, under a “drug war”
pretext dismissed by almost all serious observers. The Clinton
administration was particularly enthusiastic in its praise for
President Gaviria, whose tenure in office was responsible for
“appalling levels of violence,” according to human rights
organizations, even surpassing his predecessors. Details are readily
available.
In this
case, the U.S. reaction is (I): escalate the atrocities.
(B) Turkey.
For years, Turkish repression of Kurds has been a major scandal. It
peaked in the 1990s; one index is the flight of over a million Kurds
from the countryside to the unofficial Kurdish capital Diyarbakir from
1990 to 1994, as the Turkish army was devastating the countryside. Two
million were left homeless according to the Turkish State Minister for
Human Rights, a result of “state terrorism” in part, he acknowledged.
“Mystery killings” of Kurds (assumed to be death squad killings) alone
amounted to 3,200 in 1993 and 1994, along with torture, destruction of
thousands of villages, bombing with napalm, and an unknown number of
casualties, generally estimated in the tens of thousands; no one was
counting. The killings are attributed to Kurdish terror in Turkish
propaganda, generally adopted in the U.S. as well. Presumably Serbian
propaganda follows the same practice. 1994 marked two records in
Turkey: it was “the year of the worst repression in the Kurdish
provinces,” Jonathan Randal reported from the scene, and the year when
Turkey became “the biggest single importer of American military
hardware and thus the world’s largest arms purchaser. Its arsenal, 80
percent American, included M-60 tanks, F-16 fighter-bombers, Cobra
gunships, and Blackhawk ‘slick’ helicopters, all of which were
eventually used against the Kurds.” When human rights groups exposed
Turkey’s use of U.S. jets to bomb villages, the Clinton adminis-
tration found ways to evade laws requiring suspension of arms
deliveries, much as it was doing in Indonesia and elsewhere. Turkish
aircraft have now shifted to bombing Serbia, while Turkey is lauded
for its humanitarianism.
Colombia and
Turkey explain their (U.S.-supported) atrocities on grounds that they
are defending their countries from the threat of terrorist guerrillas.
As does the government of Yugoslavia.
Again, the
example illustrates (I): act to escalate the atrocities.
(C) Laos.
Every year thousands of people, mostly children and poor farmers, are
killed in the Plain of Jars in Northern Laos, the scene of the
heaviest bombing of civilian targets in history it appears, and
arguably the most cruel: Washington’s furious assault on a poor
peasant society had little to do with its wars in the region. The
worst period was from 1968, when Washington was compelled to undertake
negotiations (under popular and business pressure), ending the regular
bombardment of North Vietnam. Kissinger-Nixon then shifted the planes
to bombardment of Laos and Cambodia.
The deaths
are from “bombies,” tiny anti-personnel weapons, far worse than
land-mines: they are designed specifically to kill and maim, and have
no effect on trucks, buildings, etc. The Plain was saturated with
hundreds of millions of these criminal devices, which have a
failure-to-explode rate of 20 percent to 30 percent according to the
manufacturer, Honeywell. The numbers suggest either remarkably poor
quality control or a rational policy of murdering civilians by delayed
action. These were only a fraction of the technology deployed,
including advanced missiles to penetrate caves where families sought
shelter. Current annual casualties from “bombies” are estimated from
hundreds a year to “an annual nationwide casualty rate of 20,000,”
more than half of them deaths, according to the veteran Asia reporter
Barry Wain of the Wall Street Journal in its Asia edition. A
conservative estimate, then, is that the crisis last year was
approximately comparable to Kosovo, though deaths are far more highly
concentrated among children over half, according to studies reported
by the Mennonite Central Committee, which has been working there since
1977 to alleviate the continuing atrocities.
There have
been efforts to publicize and deal with the humanitarian catastrophe.
A British-based Mine Advisory Group (MAG) is trying to remove the
lethal objects, but the U.S. is “conspicuously missing from the
handful of Western organisations that have followed MAG,” the British
press reports, though it has finally agreed to train some Laotian
civilians. The British press also reports, with some annoyance, the
allegation of MAG specialists that the U.S. refuses to provide them
with “render harmless procedures” that would make their work “a lot
quicker and a lot safer.” These remain a state secret, as does the
whole affair in the United States. The Bangkok press reports a very
similar situation in Cambodia, particularly the Eastern region where
U.S. bombardment from early 1969 was most intense.
In this
case, the U.S. reaction is (II): do nothing. The reaction of the media
and commentators is to keep silent, following the norms under which
the war against Laos was designated a “secret war” meaning well-known,
but suppressed, as also in the case of Cambodia from March 1969. The
level of self-censorship was extraordinary then, as is the current
phase. The relevance of this shocking example should be obvious
without further comment.
President
Clinton explained to the nation that “there are times when looking
away simply is not an option”; “we can’t respond to every tragedy in
every corner of the world,” but that doesn’t mean that “we should do
nothing for no one.” But the President, and commentators, failed to
add that the “times” are well-defined. The principle applies to
“humanitarian crises,” in the technical sense discussed earlier: when
the interests of rich and privileged people are endangered.
Accordingly, the examples just mentioned do not qualify as
“humanitarian crises,” so looking away and not responding are
definitely options, if not obligatory. On similar grounds, Clinton’s
policies on Africa are understood by Western diplomats to be “leaving
Africa to solve its own crises.” For example, in the Republic of
Congo, scene of a major war and huge atrocities; here Clinton refused
a UN request for a trivial sum for a battalion of peacekeepers,
according to the UN’s senior Africa envoy, the highly respected
diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun, a refusal that “torpedoed” the UN proposal.
In the case of Sierra Leone, “Washington dragged out discussions on a
British proposal to deploy peacekeepers” in 1997, paving the way for
another major disaster, but also of the kind for which “looking away”
is the preferred option. In other cases too, “the United States has
actively thwarted efforts by the United Nations to take on
peacekeeping operations that might have prevented some of Africa’s
wars, according to European and UN diplomats,” correspondent Colum
Lynch reported as the plans to bomb Serbia were reaching their final
stages.
I will skip
other examples of (I) and (II), which abound, and also contemporary
atrocities of a different kind, such as the slaughter of Iraqi
civilians by means of a vicious form of what amounts to biological
warfare “a very hard choice,” Madeleine Albright commented on national
TV in 1996 when asked for her reaction to the killing of half a
million Iraqi children in five years, but “we think the price is worth
it.” Current estimates remain about 5,000 children killed a month, and
the price is still “worth it.” These and other examples might be kept
in mind when we read admiring accounts of how the “moral compass” of
the Clinton administration is at last functioning properly, in Kosovo
(Columbia University professor of preventive diplomacy David
Phillips).
Kosovo is
another illustration of (I): act in such a way as to escalate the
violence, with exactly that expectation.
To find
examples illustrating (III) is all too easy, at least if we keep to
official rhetoric. The most extensive recent academic study of
“humanitarian intervention” is by George Washington University law
professor, Sean Murphy. He reviews the record after the Kellogg-Briand
pact of 1928 which outlawed war, and then after the UN Charter, which
strengthened and articulated these provisions. In the first phase, he
writes, the most prominent examples of “humanitarian intervention”
were Japan’s attack on Manchuria, Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia,
and Hitler’s occupation of parts of Czechoslovakia, all accompanied by
uplifting humanitarian rhetoric and factual justifications as well.
Japan was going to establish an “earthly paradise” as it defended
Manchurians from “Chinese bandits,” with the support of a leading
Chinese nationalist, a far more credible figure than anyone the U.S.
was able to conjure up during its attack on South Vietnam. Mussolini
was liberating thousands of slaves as he carried forth the Western
“civilizing mission.” Hitler announced Germany’s intention to end
ethnic tensions and violence, and “safeguard the national
individuality of the German and Czech peoples,” in an operation
“filled with earnest desire to serve the true interests of the peoples
dwelling in the area,” in accordance with their will; the Slovakian
President asked Hitler to declare Slovakia a protectorate.
Another
useful intellectual exercise is to compare those obscene
justifications with those offered for interventions, including
“humanitarian interventions,” in the post-UN Charter period.
In that
period, perhaps the most compelling example of (III) is the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, terminating Pol Pot’s
atrocities, which were then peaking. Vietnam pleaded the right of
self-defense against armed attack, one of the few post-Charter
examples when the plea is plausible: the Khmer Rouge regime
(Democratic Kampuchea, DK) was carrying out murderous attacks against
Vietnam in border areas. The U.S. reaction is instructive. The press
condemned the “Prussians” of Asia for their outrageous violation of
international law. They were harshly punished for the crime of having
ended Pol Pot’s slaughters, first by a (U.S.-backed) Chinese invasion,
then by U.S. imposition of extremely harsh sanctions. The U.S.
recognized the expelled DK as the official government of Cambodia,
because of its “continuity” with the Pol Pot regime, the State
Department explained. Not too subtly, the U.S. supported the Khmer
Rouge in its continuing attacks in Cambodia. The example tells us more
about the “custom and practice” that underlies “the emerging legal
norms of humanitarian intervention.”
Another
illustration of (III) is India’s invasion of East Pakistan in 1971,
which terminated an enormous massacre and refugee flight (over ten
million, according to estimates at the time). The U.S. condemned India
for aggression; Kissinger was particularly infuriated by India’s
action, in part it seems because it was interfering with a carefully
staged secret trip to China. Perhaps this is one of the examples that
historian John Lewis Gaddis had in mind in his fawning review of the
latest volume of Kissinger’s memoirs, when he reports admiringly that
Kissinger “acknowledges here, more clearly than in the past, the
influence of his upbringing in Nazi Germany, the examples set by his
parents and the consequent impossibility, for him, of operating
outside a moral framework.” The logic is overpowering, as are the
illustrations, too well-known to record.
Again, the
same lessons.
Despite the
desperate efforts of ideologues to prove that circles are square,
there is no serious doubt that the NATO bombings further undermine
what remains of the fragile structure of international law. The U.S.
made that clear in the debates that led to the NATO decision, as
already discussed. Today, the more closely one approaches the
conflicted region, the greater the opposition to Washington’s
insistence on force, even within NATO (Greece and Italy). Again, that
is not an unusual phenomenon: another current example is the U.S./UK
bombing of Iraq, undertaken in December with unusually brazen gestures
of contempt for the Security Council even the timing, coinciding with
an emergency session to deal with the crisis. Still another
illustration, minor in context, is the destruction of half the
pharmaceutical production of a small African country a few months
earlier, another event that does not indicate that the “moral compass”
is straying from righteousness, though comparable destruction of U.S.
facilities by Islamic terrorists might evoke a slightly different
reaction. It is unnecessary to emphasize that there is a far more
extensive record that would be prominently reviewed right now if facts
were considered relevant to determining “custom and practice.”
It could be
argued, rather plausibly, that further demolition of the rules of
world order is by now of no significance, as in the late 1930s. The
contempt of the world’s leading power for the framework of world order
has become so extreme that there is little left to discuss. A review
of the internal documentary record demonstrates that the stance traces
back to the earliest days, even to the first memorandum of the
newly-formed National Security Council in 1947. During the Kennedy
years, the stance began to gain overt expression, as, for example,
when the highly respected statesperson and Kennedy adviser Dean
Acheson justified the blockade of Cuba in 1962 by informing the
American Society for International Law that a situation in which our
country’s “power, position, and prestige” are involved cannot be
treated as a “legal issue.”
The main
innovation of the Reagan-Clinton years is that defiance of
international law and solemn obligations has become entirely open. It
has also been backed with interesting explanations, which would be on
the front pages, and prominent in the school and university
curriculum, if honesty and human consequences were considered
significant values. The highest authorities explained that
international law and agencies had become irrelevant because they no
longer follow U.S. orders, as they did in the early postwar years,
when U.S. power was overwhelming. When the World Court was considering
what it later condemned as Washington’s “unlawful use of force”
against Nicaragua, Secretary of State George Shultz derided those who
advocate “utopian, legalistic means like outside mediation, the United
Nations, and the World Court, while ignoring the power element of the
equation.” Clear and forthright, and by no means original. State
Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer explained that members of the
UN can no longer “be counted on to share our view,” and the “majority
often opposes the United States on important international questions,”
so we must “reserve to ourselves the power to determine” how we will
act.
One can
follow standard practice and ignore “custom and practice,” or dismiss
it on some absurd grounds (“change of course,” “Cold War,” and other
familiar pretexts). Or we can take custom, practice, and explicit
doctrine seriously, departing from respectable norms but at least
opening the possibility of understanding what is happening in the
world.
While the
Reaganites broke new ground, under Clinton the defiance of world order
has become so extreme as to be of concern even to hawkish policy
analysts. In the current issue of the leading establishment journal,
Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington warns that Washington is
treading a dangerous course. In the eyes of much of the world probably
most of the world, he suggests the U.S. is “becoming the rogue
superpower,” considered “the single greatest external threat to their
societies.” Realist “international relations theory,” he argues,
predicts that coalitions may arise to counterbalance the rogue
superpower. On pragmatic grounds, then, the stance should be
reconsidered. Americans who prefer a different image of their society
might have other grounds for concern over these tendencies, but they
are probably of little concern to planners, with their narrower focus
and immersion in ideology.
Where does
that leave the question of what to do in Kosovo? It leaves it
unanswered. The U.S. has chosen a course of action which, as it
explicitly recognizes, escalates atrocities and violence; a course
that strikes yet another blow against the regime of international
order, which does offer the weak at least some limited protection from
predatory states; a course that undermines, perhaps destroys,
promising democratic developments within Yugoslavia, probably
Macedonia as well. As for the longer term, consequences are
unpredictable.
One
plausible observation is that “every bomb that falls on Serbia and
every ethnic killing in Kosovo suggests that it will scarcely be
possible for Serbs and Albanians to live beside each other in some
sort of peace” (Financial Times). Other possible long-term
outcomes are not pleasant to contemplate. The resort to violence has,
again predictably, narrowed the options. Perhaps the least ugly that
remains is an eventual partition of Kosovo, with Serbia taking the
northern areas that are rich in resources and have the main historical
monuments, and the southern sector becoming a NATO protectorate where
some Albanians can live in misery. Another possibility is that with
much of the population gone, the U.S. might turn to the Carthaginian
solution. If that happens, it would again be nothing new, as large
areas of Indochina can testify.
A standard
argument is that we had to do something: we could not simply stand by
as atrocities continue. The argument is so absurd that it is rather
surprising to hear it voiced. Suppose you see a crime in the streets,
and feel that you can’t just stand by silently, so you pick up an
assault rifle and kill everyone involved: criminal, victim,
bystanders. Are we to understand that to be the rational and moral
response?
One choice,
always available, is to follow the Hippocratic principle: “First, do
no harm.” If you can think of no way to adhere to that elementary
principle, then do nothing; at least that is preferable to causing
harm. But there are always other ways that can be considered.
Diplomacy and negotiations are never at an end. That was true right
before the bombing, when the Serb Parliament, responding to Clinton’s
ultimatum, called for negotiations over an “international presence in
Kosovo immediately after the signing of an accord for
self-administration in Kosovo which will be accepted by all national
communities” living in the province, reported on wire services
worldwide but scarcely noted here. Just what that meant we cannot
know, since the two warrior states preferred to reject the diplomatic
path in favor of violence.
Another
argument, if one can call it that, has been advanced most prominently
by Henry Kissinger. He believes that intervention was a mistake
(“open- ended,” quagmire, etc.). That aside, it is futile. “Through
the centuries, these conflicts [in the Balkans] have been fought with
unparalleled ferocity because none of the populations has any
experience with and essentially no belief in Western concepts of
toleration.” At last we understand why Europeans have treated each
other with such gentle solicitude “through the centuries,” and have
tried so hard over many centuries to bring to others their message of
non-violence, toleration, and loving kindness.
One can
always count on Kissinger for some comic relief, though in reality, he
is not alone. He is joined by those who ponder “Balkan logic” as
contrasted with the Western record of humane rationality. And those
who remind us of the “distaste for war or for intervention in the
affairs of others” that is “our inherent weakness,” of our dismay over
the “repeated violations of norms and rules established by
international treaty, human rights conventions” (historian Tony Judt).
We are to consider Kosovo as “A New Collision of East and West,” a
Times think piece is headlined, a clear illustration of Samuel
Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”: “a democratic West, its
humanitarian instincts repelled by the barbarous inhumanity of
Orthodox Serbs,” all of this “clear to Americans” but not to others, a
fact that Americans fail to comprehend (Huntington, interview).
Or we may
listen to the inspiring words of Secretary of Defense William Cohen,
introducing the president at Norfolk Naval Air Station. He opened by
quoting Theodore Roosevelt, speaking “at the dawn of this century, as
America was awakening into its new place in the world.” President
Roosevelt said, “Unless you’re willing to fight for great ideals,
those ideals will vanish,” and “today, at the dawn of the next
century, we’re joined by President Bill Clinton” who understands as
well as Teddy Roose- velt that “standing on the sidelines...as a
witness to the unspeakable horror that was about to take place, that
would in fact affect the peace and stability of NATO countries, was
simply unacceptable.” One has to wonder what must pass through the
mind of someone invoking this famous racist fanatic and raving
jingoist as a model of American values, along with the events that
illustrated his cherished “great ideals” as he spoke: the slaughter of
hundreds of thousands of Filipinos who had sought liberation from
Spain, shortly after Roosevelt’s contribution to preventing Cubans
from achieving the same goal.
Wiser
commentators will wait until Washington settles on an official story.
After two weeks of bombing, the story is that they both knew and
didn’t know that a catastrophe would follow. On March 28, “when a
reporter asked if the bombing was accelerating the atrocities,
[President Clinton] replied, ‘absolutely not’” (Adam Clymer). He
reiterated that stand in his April 1 speech at Norfolk: “Had we not
acted, the Serbian offensive would have been carried out with
impunity.” The following day, Pentagon spokesperson Kenneth Bacon
announced that the opposite was true: “I don’t think anyone could have
foreseen the breadth of this brutality,” the first acknowledgment by
the Administration that “it was not fully prepared for the crisis,”
the press reported a crisis that was “entirely predictable,” the
Command- ing General had informed the press a week earlier. From the
start, reports from the scene were that “the Administration had been
caught off guard” by the Serbian military reaction (Jane Perlez, and
many others).
The right of
“humanitarian intervention” is likely to be more frequently invoked in
coming years maybe with justification, maybe not now that Cold War
pretexts have lost their efficacy. In such an era, it may be
worthwhile to pay attention to the views of highly respected
commentators—not to speak of the World Court, which ruled on the
matter of intervention and “humanitarian aid” in a decision rejected
by the United States, its essentials not even reported.
In the
scholarly disciplines of international affairs and international law
it would be hard to find more respected voices than Hedley Bull or
Louis Henkin. Bull warned 15 years ago that “Particular states or
groups of states that set themselves up as the authoritative judges of
the world common good, in disregard of the views of others, are in
fact a menace to international order, and thus to effective action in
this field.” Henkin, in a standard work on world order, writes that
the “pressures eroding the prohibition on the use of force are
deplorable, and the arguments to legitimize the use of force in those
circumstances are unpersuasive and dangerous...Violations of human
rights are indeed all too common, and if it were permissible to remedy
them by external use of force, there would be no law to forbid the use
of force by almost any state against almost any other. Human rights, I
believe, will have to be vindicated, and other injustices remedied, by
other, peaceful means, not by opening the door to aggression and
destroying the principal advance in international law, the outlawing
of war and the prohibition of force.”
Recognized principles of international law and world order, treaty obligations, decisions by the World Court, considered pronouncements by the most respected commentators these do not automatically yield solutions to particular problems. Each has to be considered on its merits. For those who do not adopt the standards of Saddam Hussein, there is a heavy burden of proof to meet in undertaking the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international order. Perhaps the burden can be met, but that has to be shown, not merely proclaimed with passionate rhetoric. The consequences of such violations have to be assessed carefully—in particular, what we take to be “predictable.” For those who are minimally serious, the reasons for the actions also have to be assessed on rational grounds, with attention to historical fact and the documentary record, not simply by adulation of our leaders and their “moral compass.” |
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